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Research
My research explores the intersection of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics in 18th-century German philosophy. In particular, I examine this intersection through Kant’s theory of free will and its early reception, tracing its transformation in post-Kantian thought.
My book project, Kant and the Fate of Freedom, investigates the development of Kant’s account of free will in dialogue with his early critics and shows the impact of these debates on the emergence of German Idealism. This project reconceives Kant’s theory of freedom by situating it within the contested terrain of its early reception, demonstrating its dynamic responsiveness to his critics of the first hour. In doing so, the book transforms our understanding of the development of post-Kantian philosophy: the fate of freedom in German Idealism manifests the formative tensions first articulated in Kant’s immediate reception.
I also investigate moral obligation and practical reasoning in 18th-century German philosophy. “Kant’s Principia Diiudicationis and Executionis,” awarded the Wilfrid Sellars Prize of the North American Kant Society and published in Kantian Review, argues that Kant’s two principles of obligation––the principles of appraisal and execution––anticipate his mature account of moral motivation. Christian Wolff’s German Ethics (Oxford University Press), which I co-edited, highlights the historical and systematic significance of Wolff’s moral philosophy. My contribution to the volume challenges the view that Wolff reduces obligation to the occurrence of mental states, showing instead that his position is best understood as a theory of ideal practical rationality: obligation expresses the normative force of practical propositions on which purely rational agents would ideally act.
Ethics and Agency, my next book project, transposes Kant’s moral philosophy into an inferentialist-pragmatic key in order to investigate how the conditions of language use shape the structure of rational agency. This linguistic context illuminates the inferential and illocutionary dimensions of moral obligation. The book ultimately shows that language use imposes deontic strictures on practical rationality.
My work on 18th-century German philosophy extends to translation. Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the Will (Cambridge University Press) offers translations documenting the intense debates surrounding the reception of Kant’s account of free will. I am currently co-editor of The Cambridge Reinhold Translations, a multi-volume edition of the works of K. L. Reinhold, also under contract with Cambridge University Press, in which I serve as co-editor of the volumes, translator of one, and co-translator of another.
My book project, Kant and the Fate of Freedom, investigates the development of Kant’s account of free will in dialogue with his early critics and shows the impact of these debates on the emergence of German Idealism. This project reconceives Kant’s theory of freedom by situating it within the contested terrain of its early reception, demonstrating its dynamic responsiveness to his critics of the first hour. In doing so, the book transforms our understanding of the development of post-Kantian philosophy: the fate of freedom in German Idealism manifests the formative tensions first articulated in Kant’s immediate reception.
I also investigate moral obligation and practical reasoning in 18th-century German philosophy. “Kant’s Principia Diiudicationis and Executionis,” awarded the Wilfrid Sellars Prize of the North American Kant Society and published in Kantian Review, argues that Kant’s two principles of obligation––the principles of appraisal and execution––anticipate his mature account of moral motivation. Christian Wolff’s German Ethics (Oxford University Press), which I co-edited, highlights the historical and systematic significance of Wolff’s moral philosophy. My contribution to the volume challenges the view that Wolff reduces obligation to the occurrence of mental states, showing instead that his position is best understood as a theory of ideal practical rationality: obligation expresses the normative force of practical propositions on which purely rational agents would ideally act.
Ethics and Agency, my next book project, transposes Kant’s moral philosophy into an inferentialist-pragmatic key in order to investigate how the conditions of language use shape the structure of rational agency. This linguistic context illuminates the inferential and illocutionary dimensions of moral obligation. The book ultimately shows that language use imposes deontic strictures on practical rationality.
My work on 18th-century German philosophy extends to translation. Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the Will (Cambridge University Press) offers translations documenting the intense debates surrounding the reception of Kant’s account of free will. I am currently co-editor of The Cambridge Reinhold Translations, a multi-volume edition of the works of K. L. Reinhold, also under contract with Cambridge University Press, in which I serve as co-editor of the volumes, translator of one, and co-translator of another.
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